








Do loan officers get soft by the month-end? 
Lending inefficiency and the end-of-month effect: 










Dissertation written under the supervision of  




Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the Master of 





Do loan officers get soft by the month-end?  
Lending inefficiency and the end-of-month effect: 








In this dissertation, we study the monthly distribution of all loans granted to Portuguese 
non-financial companies, between 2013 and 2016. We find a strong evidence of an 
end-of-month effect: 38% of all loans were granted in the last three days of the month. 
We isolate this effect and conclude that it is derived from credit lines, with a default 
rate 4.5x times higher than similar credit lines granted on the remaining days of the 
month. We find a reversal pattern on the 15th of each month, which we justify as a 
possible window dressing strategy from Portuguese banks – they have to report their 
loans’ portfolio by this time of the month. Our results are robust to both the number of 
operations initiated (extensive margin) and the average loan amount (intensive 
margin). We perform a back-of-the-envelope computation and compute an increase in 
potential future credit losses of €3.2 billion as a consequence of the end-of-month 
relaxation in loan officers’ standards. Our dissertation contributes to the field of end-
of-month performance misalignments in a banking context, but takes a step forward: 
prior studies consider this event a consequence of variable compensation based on loan 
volume. In our context, we are able to split between banks that reward loan officers 
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Os gestores de crédito ficam brandos no fim do mês? 
Ineficiência na alocação de empréstimos e o efeito de 








Nesta dissertação, estudamos a distribuição mensal de todos os empréstimos 
concedidos a empresas portuguesas não-financeiras, entre 2013 e 2016. Encontramos 
evidência significativa de um efeito de fim de mês: em média, 38% dos empréstimos 
foram concedidos nos últimos três dias do mês. Isolamos este efeito e concluímos que 
é derivado de linhas de crédito com uma taxa de incumprimento 4.5x superior às linhas 
de crédito concedidas nos restantes dias do mês. No dia 15 de cada mês ocorre um 
padrão de inversão: os empréstimos concedidos apresentam perspetivas 
significativamente superiores, o que justificamos como uma possível estratégia de 
window dressing por parte dos bancos portugueses – têm de reportar o seu portfólio de 
empréstimos nesta altura do mês. Os resultados obtidos são robustos à utilização do 
número de operações (margem extensiva), bem como ao volume de cada empréstimo 
(margem intensiva). Efetuamos cálculos de impacto do efeito de fim de mês, e 
concluímos que aumentaram em €3.2 mil milhões o valor de potenciais futuras perdas. 
A nossa dissertação contribui para a área que estuda desalinhamentos de performance 
no fim do período num contexto bancário, mas dá um passo extra: estudos anteriores 
consideram este evento como uma consequência de compensação variável baseada no 
volume de empréstimos. No nosso contexto, conseguimos separar entre bancos que 
recompensam os gestores de crédito com base no volume concedido, e os bancos que 
não o fazem: o efeito de fim de mês é comum a ambos. 
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The role of loan officers in banks’ performance is unquestionable (Gao et al., 2017). By being 
responsible for screening and granting loans, and monitoring its performance, they manage to 
be at the very core of a commercial bank’s business. In the aftermath of the 2007 subprime 
crisis, a source of market risk was identified in the banking sector: the incentive structure of 
loan officers. Many studies have, since then, focused both on the banks’ executive level and 
lower-level personnel compensation, as a proxy for risk-taking behaviors. However, there is 
still little evidence on the time distribution of these behaviors. Is it feasible to assume that the 
level of risk that loan officers take is always the same? This will be the main research question 
throughout our dissertation. 
Previous studies have revealed biases that stand out by the end of a period. Oyer (1998) showed 
that firms hold an incentive to shape both prices and the timing of customers’ acquisitions, 
which goes in line with economic agents’ paying special attention to performance measures by 
the end of the fiscal year. In a completely different setting, yet illustrative of this bias, Asch 
(1990) exposed that navy recruiters manage their effort in an attempt to win awards by having 
a better output in months prior to becoming eligible to win the award. Larkin (2007) used data 
from a software vendor and reports that salesman force the closure of the majority of their deals 
by the last day of the quarter. In a banking context, there is significant literature that proves the 
existence of behavioral biases that distort the economic efficiency of capital allocation, 
especially in the end of a period – either a quarter (Ertan, 2017) or a month (Tzioumis and Gee, 
2013; Cao et al., 2018). 
In this dissertation, we attempt to demystify the risk-taking behavior of Portuguese loan 
officers, using all loans granted to non-financial corporations from 2013 to 2016. By using 
proprietary databases of the Bank of Portugal, we manage to isolate the end-of-month effect, id 
est, the universe of loans granted on the last three days of the month. Our first finding, and the 
main driver of the remaining of our dissertation, is that the end-of-month effect incorporated 
38% of all loans granted in the period of analysis. Moreover, this effect has been rising 
throughout time, reaching 44% in 2016. The increase verified by the end of the month is robust 
to both an assessment of the number of operations and the loan amount granted. We create six 
indicators that provide a comprehensive view of a company’s credit risk, measured a priori: 
size, age, profitability, liquidity, leverage and tangibility. We conclude that loans granted by 
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the end of the month are conceded to smaller, younger, less profitable and liquid and more 
levered companies, hence riskier. Even though this evidence of risk-taking may decrease when 
we acknowledge that the average interest rate increases by the end of the month (from 6.6% to 
12.1%), it goes back to its original point when we assess that the average number of 
collateralized loans decreases from 44% to 27%. As we anticipated, the delinquency rate, 
measured 1-year after the loan origination, is 2x larger for end-of-month loans. 
We further split our sample in term loans and credit lines and conclude that the end-of-month 
effect is driven by credit lines. Term loans present small, yet, statistically significant, 
differences between both periods of the month. Credit lines present major differences between 
both periods, and five out of the six previously defined indicators point out to an increase in 
risk-taking by the end of the month. The default rate of end-of-month credit lines is 4.5 times 
higher than credit lines granted during the rest of the month. We analyze whether there is a 
repetition pattern of credit lines, id est, how frequent it is for a bank to grant a credit line to the 
same company in repeated periods. We assess that 68% of credit lines have a monthly pattern 
and we justify this fact with a possible utilization of overdraft lines of credit – a tool that 
companies use when they fall short on liquidity.  
The day 15th presents a reversal trend: loans granted by this day have characteristics that reveal 
a special concern on approving safer loans and, consequently, a lower default rate (3 percentage 
points lower). We believe that this behavior may be related with the fact that, by this time of 
the month, commercial banks have to report their loan portfolio status to the Central Credit 
Register managed by the Bank of Portugal, hence creating an incentive to develop a window 
dressing strategy (Allen and Saunders, 1992). We also study the monthly evolution of the loans’ 
time to approval, which increases as the end of the month approaches, hence revealing 
contradictory findings to Tzioumis and Gee (2013) and also to our original intuition – we 
expected that time to approval by the end of the month would decrease: since loan officers 
approve riskier loans, it could be the case that they would rush the approval process. However, 
if we consider that bad prospect loans arrive approximately evenly throughout the month, loan 
officers may keep those loans in their inventory of prospect loans and only approve them by 
the end of the month, in case they need to attain a minimum capital allocation quota. This 
waiting process increases the time to approval, hence justifying with our results. 
The field of performance-based compensation has been a subject of interest by several 
academics that strive to determine the impact it holds, not only in the output per se, but also on 
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the long-term consequences of that output. In a banking context, more specifically in the loan 
concession process, numerous studies (for instance Agarwal and Ben-David, 2018 and Cao et 
al., 2018) have proven an increase in the end-of-month output as a consequence of volume-
based compensation. Our dissertation builds on this foundation, but takes a step forward: we 
are able to distinguish between banks that hold variable-based compensation and the ones that 
have a fixed-based compensation, based on the fact that, during the Portuguese Economic 
Adjustment Program that started in 2011, banks that held negative levels of profitability were 
not likely to use variable-based compensation systems. A key finding is that the end-of-month 
effect remains, even though it is more magnified in banks that follow a compensation based on 
volume, which goes in line with the previously referred authors. In this way, we do 
acknowledge an impact arising from loan officers’ compensation, but we find that this acts as 
a magnifier, and not as a determinant factor. We also develop a back-of-the-envelope 
computation on the impact of loan officers’ standards relaxation by the end of the month. We 
forecast that credit overdue might have increased by approximately €3.2 billion during the four 
years of our study, which represents an increase of 63% compared with the case where loan 
officers do not change their behavior by the end of the month. 
Our study contributes to several streams of ongoing research. The first one relates to the 
distortionary effects of performance incentives and moral hazard in banks. Existing research in 
the area of incentive compensation focuses mainly on risk-taking among top-level executives 
(Bebchuk et al., 2010; Bolton et al., 2015; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2012). By concluding that 
loan officers that are subject to variable-based compensation drive the end-of-month effect to 
higher levels, our results follow the past literature that mentions that when loan officers’ 
incentives are not aligned with those of their employers (the lender), too many risky loans are 
approved as a consequence (Inderst, 2008; Heider and Inderst, 2012). By studying the 1-year 
default rates of loans granted by the end of the month, we add to the current research on banks’ 
risk exposure due to compensation for short-term performance (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2009; 
Acharya et al., 2013). 
Secondly, our dissertation adds to the literature on the end-of-month effect. As we have 
previously mentioned, banks that do not hold a reward scheme based on performance-based 
compensation are also driving the end-of-month effect. As such, we extend past research that 
studied this bias as a “compensation-based” one. The end-of-period effect remains as an open 
research topic that is transversal to several areas besides banking, ranging from non-financial 
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employees’ productivity (Asch, 1990; Larkin, 2007) to financial markets (Lakonishok and 
Smidt, 1988; Carchano et al., 2011). 
Thirdly, and an aspect that we have been striving for since the day we initially thought about 
our research topic: we contribute to the body of research that uses Portugal as a case study, 
mostly derived from the top-quality data available. More precisely, we add to the literature that 
studies the Portuguese banking system and its impact on the economy (Crosignani et al., 2015; 
Blattner et al., 2017; Bonfim and Soares, 2018; Bonfim et al., 2018). 
The remainder of our dissertation proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the most relevant 
literature regarding the end-of-month effect and the associated incentives for this phenomenon. 
Section 3 describes the data we used and provides detailed descriptive analysis. Section 4 
reports our methodology and empirical findings, whereas Section 5 displays robustness tests. 
We conclude in Section 6, and present our references, tables and appendices in Sections 7, 8 
and 9, respectively. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Financial theory has progressed a lot regarding economic agents’ assumptions on rationality 
and market efficiency. We assumed, for a long time, that investors were rational in their 
decisions and expectations (Muth, 1961; Lucas, 1978) and that the economic system enabled 
the creation of the widely-known concept of market efficiency (Samuelson, 1965; Fama, 1965; 
Lo, 2004). Some years before, there was already evidence on the possible irrelevance of capital 
structure decisions on the value of a firm (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). But similar to all 
theories, the market efficiency hypothesis started to show some signs of weakness. Behavioral 
scientists have proven a deviation pattern arising from decision-making under uncertainty, 
which leads to an unpredictable effect in welfare. This pattern is a combination of several 
psychological factors, such as overreaction (De Bondt and Thaler, 1987), herding (Welch, 
2000; Huberman and Regev, 2001) and hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997). 
 Moving to an industry context, there is evidence of an end-of-month effect on several activities. 
Liebman and Mahoney (2017) studied the year-end budget effect on procurement spending by 
the US Federal Government. The authors report that spending (in a “use-it-or-lose-it” setting) 
in the last week of the year is substantially higher than the rest of the year’s weekly average and 
that year-end IT projects have lower quality ratings. Oyer (1998) showed that salesperson and 
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executive compensation contracts usually stipulate a nonlinear relationship between revenue 
and pay, creating an incentive to manipulate prices and the timing of customer purchases. This 
creates a consistent connection with agents’ focusing on performance by the end of the fiscal 
year. Firms also engage in this “controlled productivity”, a practice called “earnings 
management”, which occurs when managers use judgement to assemble a transaction to modify 
financial reports with the purpose of either misleading other parties or attaining benefits 
underlying to the reported figures (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). This phenomenon deserves a high 
level of consideration, given the fact that it twists the allocation of economic funds in the 
economy (Kedia and Philippon, 2007). 
 The banking sector is no exception to the previously reported end-of-period variation in 
multiple business-specific activities. Cao et al. (2018) studied the monthly distribution of loans 
in two Chinese banks. They find that daily end-of-month lending is 95% higher in the last five 
days of each month. However, this increase in loan amount comes at the expense of loan quality: 
end-of-month loans are 2.1 percentage points more likely to be classified as bad loans in the 
years following issuance. Ertan (2017) performed a similar study using syndicated lending 
activities, the largest source of external financing for non-financing firms (Sufi, 2007). He finds 
that, when lead arrangers are falling behind estimated earnings, they tend to increase the amount 
of loans issued and reduce the long-term price, while increasing short-term proceeds. This will 
maximize the immediate advantages of lending, but the long-term prospects are worse: the CDS 
spread on the borrower’s outstanding debt increases by approximately 8.5% on the year after 
the issuance of these loans. Tzioumis and Gee (2013) showed that mortgage officers increase 
their output by the end of the month when the minimum monthly quota is evaluated, through a 
mixture of lower processing time and approval of some doubtful applications. They report that 
mortgages at the last day of the month have a higher rate of delinquency. There is also evidence 
on strong seasonality in the interest rates’ market (Murfin and Peterson, 2016): companies that 
borrow during the cheaper season (late spring and fall) issue at 19 basis points cheaper than the 
ones issuing in the winter and summer. Ben-David (2011) presented evidence that mortgage 
brokers encourage borrowers to artificially inflate transaction prices simply to gain access to 
larger mortgages, as a way of reducing their monthly payment. Agarwal et al. (2013) exposed 
that financially constrained borrowers have the incentive to manipulate the appraisal process, 
with the aim of increasing borrowing or reducing the interest rates. Keys et al. (2009) showed 
that the securitization process adversely affected the screening incentives of lenders. All the 
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previous studies reveal that misaligned incentives of financial mediators lead to transactions 
that, in normal conditions, would not occur. 
 After having acknowledged the existence of variations (either monthly or yearly) in the banking 
industry, the question that remains concerns its justification. We can take two different 
perspectives: the company and the bank. Starting by the former, one could argue that companies 
require bigger amounts of cash by the end of the month. However, given that salaries are paid 
either by the end or the beginning of the month, we can assume that there is not that much 
variation in both scenarios. Besides that, the remaining expenses can be assumed to be 
distributed throughout the month. The only effect that goes in line with this client-driven theory 
is the existence of budget deviations that would require the companies to ask for loans. Mian 
and Santos (2018) provided evidence that firm demand-side factors are indeed major drivers of 
pro-cyclical refinancing patterns over the credit cycle. There is research on household liquidity 
requirements (Telyukova, 2013), but we were unable to find sustained evidence on firm-driven 
liquidity constraints by the end of the month. 
 The other possibility is a bank-driven justification. Agarwal and Ben-David (2018) studied how 
compensation based on loan-volume affects loan amounts and delinquency rates. Their findings 
conclude that rewarding-systems based on volume generate more loans and a higher ex post 
default rate on these loans. Cole et al. (2015) reported similar findings for loan officers in a 
commercial bank in India. The impact of nonlinear contracts in performance is also a typical 
research object (Asch, 1990; Oyer, 1998). A common pattern of all these studies is that 
performance spikes at the end of each period. The impact of this type of contracts is currently 
under debate. Despite being often used in financial institutions, it can sometimes motivate 
counterproductive behavior (Jensen, 2003). Behr et al. (2017) provided evidence that, using a 
nonlinear compensation structure that benefits loan volume and punishes poor performance, 
loan officers that are at risk of losing their bonuses will increase prospecting and monitoring 
activities, usually by the end of the month. We can therefore conclude that the two effects are 
not mutually exclusive, since there is evidence on a variation on both demand and supply of 
credit granting throughout the month. 
 On a broader setting, several studies examine the effect of nonlinear incentive contracts in 
organizations. Holström and Milgrom (1991) stated that agents allocate more effort to activities 
that are directly rewarded, while disregarding uncompensated ones, activities which might be 
essential for the firm’s efficiency. Bénabou and Tirole (2016) investigated this “bonus culture” 
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and found that it takes over the workplace, generating distorted decisions that lead to severe 
losses of efficiency, especially in the long run.  
 A different strand of literature assesses the impact of hard and soft information on loan officers’ 
activities. Extensive research has found that the use of soft information (private and qualitative) 
allows officers to enhance the monitoring and screening of their loan portfolio, thus reducing 
the likelihood of loan defaults (e.g., Petersen, 2004; Berg et al. 2013). On the other hand, studies 
from Stein (2002) and Campbell et al. (2017) suggest that agents suffer from cognitive 
constraints that hinder their capacities of processing and interpreting soft information, hence 
undermining their loan approval decision process. The authors identified hard information as a 
potential solution for the internal agency problems within banks.  
 To sum it all up, we can conclude that the impact of loan officers’ behavior on the 2008 financial 
crises has sparked the interest of the academia. As Liberti and Mian (2009) concluded, banks 
suffer an intrinsic agency problem: the loan capital is provided by the lender, but it is the loan 
officer that approves the loan, using information that the bank cannot perceive or authenticate, 




Our laboratory is Portugal from January 2013 to December 2016. In this section, we first 
describe the databases we required to perform our analysis. We then proceed by explaining all 
the data treatment that was required, and we conclude with a description and interpretation of 
relevant descriptive statistics. 
In order to accomplish our study, we had access to several proprietary databases of the Bank of 
Portugal. The main database we used holds all the new operations (id est, loans granted) in 
Portugal to non-financial corporations. This dataset (hereinafter NewOps) is a comprehensive 
set of data with 8,825,903 observations and its characteristics include, but are not limited to, 
anonymized tax identification number (TINA), anonymized bank identification number 
(BINA), concession date, amount, interest rate and collateral. NewOps effectively comprises 
all the relevant characteristics regarding the loans that loan officers granted.  
We also had access to Informação Empresarial Simplificada (hereinafter IES), a Portuguese 
mandatory company census that includes accounting figures of all Portuguese companies, both 
from balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement, for all years of our analysis.  
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Thirdly, we used Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito (hereinafter CRC), a dataset from 
the Bank of Portugal that contains information of all credit responsibilities assumed by all 
natural or legal entities, including the type of loan, the debtor, the amount and the status of 
loans. This status refers to whether credit has become overdue, if it was renegotiated, or if it 
holds an off-balance sheet exposure, such as a bank guarantee or a credit line that has not been 
used yet. The objective of the CRC is to allow financial entities to make estimations of the 
default probability of their prospective borrowers. Banks are required to report the length a loan 
is overdue at a monthly frequency, for all loans granted above 50 euros. All financial institutions 
are allowed to consult financial information on their current and perspective clients, with their 
previous consent, allowing CRC to become a crucial information-sharing mechanism between 
banks, hence decreasing the level of information asymmetry that arises in the loan granting 
process.  
Lastly, we had access to a dataset that reports the consultation date in which the loan officer 
consulted the credit status of the prospective client on the CRC database. 
We will only consider loans whose operation date is between 1st January 2013 and 31st 
December 2016. For this reason, we used NewOps as the main dataset, and the remaining three 
were merged to it. All observations before 2013 and after 2016 were, as previously referred, 
removed (which reduces our data by more than 18%). Loans that were missing TINA or BINA 
were excluded. Following Bates et al. (2009), and since we are only interested in active 
corporations, we exclude companies with a negative value of assets, revenues or employees. 
Loans conceded to companies established outside Portugal were also removed. In order to avoid 
double-accounting the same operation, we exclude all credit renegotiations (approximately 17% 
of the original dataset). The interest rate, maturity, loan amount and all the variables used from 
IES were winsorized at a 1% and 99% level.  
For the period under analysis, we have a total of 2,956,307 new operations, comprising a total 
of 150,923 different borrowers (TINA) and 47 different lenders (BINA). A thorough analysis 
on the borrowers’ segment allows us to conclude that 94,930 and 108,219 borrowers had a 
credit line and a term loan, respectively, in our period, whereas 52,226 different companies held 
both types of credit. 
We find it useful to make a preliminary analysis of the financial profile of companies that were 
granted a loan in our period of analysis, as well as the loan characteristics. Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics for the aggregate level (Panel A) and year-level (Panel B). We created six 
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new variables as proxies for size (natural logarithm of assets), age (number of years since the 
company was founded), tangibility (tangible assets to total assets ratio), profitability (return on 
assets), leverage (debt to assets ratio) and liquidity (current ratio). We also study the loan 
amount, collateral (reported as a dummy variable), maturity, interest rate and average 
processing time, defined as the difference between the consultation date and the operation date. 
Lastly, we study the one-year default rate, measured at the firm-bank relationship: if the firm 
fails the payment of one loan to the bank, all the loans that the firm has on that bank are assumed 
to default during that period. 
The mean loan amount for our period of analysis is 59,468€. On average, companies that had 
access to credit have 21 years of existence, 24.1% of its assets are tangible, a negative ROA of 
-1.9%, 79.3% of leverage and a current ratio of 1.9. Regarding loan characteristics, on average, 
37.0% of loans granted have collateral and hold a maturity of 144 days. The average processing 
time is 33 days and the average interest rate is 8.7%. The one-year default rate is, on average, 
6% across our time period. 
We can also analyze the evolution of credit concession throughout the period of analysis. The 
number of loans granted by banks grew 29.1%, although we raise the concern that this value 
may not take into account the entire Portuguese credit market, since at its inception, the 
NewOps database did not include all banks. Regarding the company characteristics, there is 
evidence on banks’ lending money to smaller, but older companies. Tangibility improved 5.5% 
during the 4 years. Profitability is raising throughout time, but remains at negative levels, 
moving from -3% in 2013 to -1% in 2016.  The liquidity ratio presents improvements year on 
year, having improved 13.1% from 2013 to 2016. The leverage ratio remained virtually the 
same. Loan characteristics also present interesting findings: the collateral and maturity 
increased 65.3% (from 24% to 43%) and 8.2%, respectively, from 2013 to 2016. The average 
processing time and the interest rate decreased in our period of analysis, 9.4% and 2.58 
percentage points, respectively. The delinquency rate (measured as a 1-year default occurrence) 
is decreasing, year-on-year, as it goes from 8% in 2013 to 5% in 2016.  
There are several conclusions we can extract from our descriptive analysis, for the period of 
our study. First, the number of loans (and respective amount) grew. The average interest rate 
decreased, which is in line with the expansionary monetary policy adopted by the ECB in the 
years that proceeded the 2010 sovereign crisis (Blattner et. al, 2016). Loan quality, measured a 
priori (using companies’ financial information) does not present a clear pattern: on one hand, 
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tangibility and liquidity ratios are improving, which decreases the level of credit risk (Bonfim, 
2009; Psillaki, 2010) and companies are getting older, thus safer (Thornill and Amit, 2003; Fink 
et al., 2004); on the other hand, companies are getting smaller, hence riskier (Bunn and 
Redwood, 2003; Jiménez and Saurina, 2004), and remain with negative levels of profitability. 
However, the average delinquency rate is decreasing across time. The average processing time 
decreased, which means that banks are speeding up the approval process (the development of 
new bank-related technologies may have played a role). 
An interesting finding of our analysis is that 38.2% of our sample has zero maturity, meaning 
it is a credit line. In the next chapter of this dissertation, we will take this effect into account, to 
assess the impact it holds on the monthly evolution of credit granting. Figure 1 displays the 
evolution of the Portuguese credit market from 2013 to 2016, regarding the daily number of 
new operations. The blue dots presented in the graph match the last day of each month in our 
time period. As one can see, there are spikes in the number of new operations at each of the 48 
last days of our period (4 years x 12 months), which provides a preliminary graphical 





Figure 1: Evolution of new operations 
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4. Methodology and empirical analysis 
 
In this section, we start by dividing our results in “end-of-month” and “rest of the month” 
(section 4.1). In order to provide a preliminary robustness test, we also present a comparison 
between the “end-of-month” and the “beginning of month” (loans granted in the first three days 
of the month). We continue with a segmentation between term loans and credit lines (section 
4.2). The day 15th also presents interesting findings, reported in section 4.3. In section 4.4 we 
study the variable that represents the time to approval. We conclude with a back-of-the-
envelope calculation to gauge the impact of the end-of-month increase in credit concession. 
 
4.1. End of month vs. rest of the month 
 
The core of our research is to study the impact of an eventual end-of-month effect on loan 
concession. To do so, we start by analyzing the daily distribution of loans granted in our time 
period. As we can see from Figure 2, there is a major concentration on the number of new 
operations by the last days of the month. It is important to clarify that we present (in the x-axis) 
the number of days before the last day of the month, to take into account the fact that not all 
months have the same number of days. In fact, 37.6% of all loans are approved on the last three 
days of the month and the last day of the month holds, by itself, 25.9%. Figure 3 presents the 
evolution of the end-of-month effect across our time-horizon and we can see a growing pattern 
since 2013. In 2013, 28.3% of all loans granted occurred, on average, on the last three days of 
the month, whereas in 2016 this effect represented 44.2% of the Portuguese credit market. 
These results are two folded: on one hand, there is evidence of a decrease in the number of 
loans granted to companies, year-on-year, since 2013 (Bank of Portugal, 2018), which could 
lead to a primary intuition of forecasting a decrease in the end-of-month effect. However, one 
can argue that a decrease in the number of loans conceded to companies may be related to a 
decrease in the prospects of the same companies. If we consider a minimum monthly-quota 
setting for loan officers, Tzioumis and Gee (2013) provide evidence that, when this quota is 
assessed, mortgage officers increase their output by the end of the month by approving marginal 
applications. Making a parallelism to loan officers and joining both effects, a decrease in the 
quantity of loans’ applications, combined with the reported end-of-month effect, will increase 




Figure 4 reports the average amount of loans granted by each day of the month. The results are 
parallel to the ones previously reported, as we can assess an increase in the average volume by 
the end of the month. We can therefore conclude the existence of both an extensive (number of 









In order to confirm our findings, we run regression (1), where the variables of interest, 𝐼(𝑑(𝑡) =
𝑑) are a set of dummy variables, designating that date t is on day-of-the-month d. The other 
variables include fixed effects for the day-of-the-week (𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡) and month x year (𝑦𝑚𝑡). Our 
dependent variable, 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡, is number of loans granted at day t. Figure 5 plots the 
regression coefficients {𝛽−1, …,   𝛽−30}, where 𝛽−𝑡 represents the impact of the day of the 
month 30 − 𝑡. The results are virtually the same as the ones presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 4: Daily distribution of average loan amount 
Figure 2: Daily distribution of new operations (new contracts) Figure 3: Evolution of the end-of-month effect 
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                                𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑑
30
𝑑=0









Following Cao et al. (2018) we create a new specification of our model: we will also study the 
differences between the end-of-month and the beginning-of-month effect. For this, we start by 
running regression (2) that uses that same fixed effects as regression (1), but now considers the 
cluster of loans granted by the first three days of the month, against the end-of-month cluster. 
The results are reported on Table 2. We find a strong impact on the number of operations for 
loans granted by the end of the month: the number of operations increases by 10.2%, compared 
with the average of the rest of the month. The impact of the first three days is also statistically 
significant, but economically meaningless. 
 
                                      𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 =  𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡3𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡3𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝑦𝑚𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡                                    (2) 
The question that remains concerns the intrinsic characteristics of the loans originated by the 
end of the month. In order to make a pre-study on the quality of these loans we split the loans 
originated into two categories concerning its approval date: loans granted on the last three days 
of the month and loans conceded on the remaining days. Table 3 presents our results. 
Starting our analysis with the six company characteristics we selected, operations started on the 
end of the month are granted, on average, to younger (∆=-3 years) companies, that have lower 
profitability (∆=-5 p.p.) and liquidity (∆=-0.09) and a higher leverage ratio (∆=17 p.p.). The 
level of tangibility remains the same, but the difference between the end-of-month and the rest 
of the month is not statistically significant. Since size is defined as the natural logarithm of 
Figure 5: Coefficient plot for regression (1) 
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assets, we have to perform a logarithmic transformation, defined as 𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠. We conclude that 
loans granted by the end of the month are provided to smaller companies (653 thousands vs 
1,983 thousands of euros in assets). Concerning the average loan contract, loans granted in the 
end-of-month period have, on average, a higher loan amount (∆≈20,000€) and a smaller 
percentage of it is collateralized (∆=17 p.p.). Maturity is significantly lower (∆=-178 days) and 
the interest rate is higher (∆=5.6 p.p.). Loans granted at the end of the month have a higher 
processing time (∆=8 days), a finding exploited in section 4.4, and the default rate, measured 
as a 1-year delinquency rate, is higher. (∆=4 p.p.). Besides the variable defined to measure 
tangibility, all the remaining differences between loans granted by the end of the month and the 
rest of the month are statistically significant at a 1% level. 
From a risk perspective, these results provide an initial background on banks’ risk-taking 
behavior: operations initiated on the last three days of the month are granted, on average, to 
riskier companies, id est, smaller, younger, less profitable and liquid and more levered. The 
loan contract itself holds a higher amount and a small percentage of them are collateralized. 
The higher interest rate verified may be an attempt by the loan officer to offset the higher risk 
of the contract. The default rates observed verify our initial intuition that these loans are indeed 
riskier: it doubles (from 4% to 8%), when comparing loans granted at the end of the month with 
loans compared on the remainder of the month. 
We run regression (2), but we use as dependent variable a vector of firm characteristics and 
loan contracts’ details. The results are presented in Table 2 and confirm our earlier assessment 
on banks’ risk-taking by the end of the month. All variables show a decline in the companies’ 
prospects towards the month-end, except the level of tangibility that remains virtually the same. 
The details of the contract also confirm three findings that are worth reporting, since they drive 
a major part of our henceforth analysis. The first one is that the coefficient associated with the 
default rate of loans granted on the last three days is positive (0.04), whereas the same 
coefficient for the first three days is 0.00. The second finding is a major decrease in the maturity 
of end-month loans, compared with the average of the remaining of the month (-181.1). Lastly, 
the time to approval for the last three days shows a positive coefficient of 7.1, against 0.1 for 
the first three days. All previously reported coefficients are statistically significant at a 1% 





4.2. Term loans vs. credit lines 
 
As pointed out in chapter 3., 38.2% of our sample is composed of credit lines. For that reason, 
we feel the need to establish a division between term loans (loans with a reported maturity 
higher than zero days) and credit lines (loans reported with a maturity of zero days). A firm that 
gets a credit line (also called a revolving credit facility) will take a nominal amount of debt 
capacity against which the firm withdraws funds. The used amount of the credit line is a debt 
obligation, whereas the unused portion remains off the balance sheet. The pricing of a credit 
line does not match the one of a typical term loan: companies will pay a commitment fee on the 
unused portion and a pre-established funding rate on the used share. 
In Table 4, we present a comparison between term loans and credit lines. Credit lines present a 
higher risk-profile, derived from the fact they are granted, on average, to smaller, younger, less 
profitable and more levered companies. Both the amount of the operation and the interest rate 
is higher for credit lines, whereas only 33% of credit lines are collateralized (against 40% of 
term loans). The default rate is 2x higher for credit lines (8%). All the differences are 
statistically significant at a 1% level. 
Following this initial analysis, we then assess if the end-of-month exists on both credit lines 
and term loans. Figures 5 and 6 present our findings, applying the same methodology as the 
one reported for Figure 2. We can see that credit lines drove the end-of-month effect – term 
loans do not present any variation regarding the amount of new operations. 
 
In Table 5 we present a summary of the differences between credit lines and term loans, as well 
as operations initiated at the end of the month against the ones started during the rest of the 
month. 
Figure 7: Daily distribution of new operations (new 
contracts) for credit lines 
Figure 6: Daily distribution of new operations (new 
contracts) for term loans 
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Term loans present small, nevertheless statistically significant differences (at a 1% significance 
level) between both periods of the month. Term loans granted by the end of the month are 
conceded to larger (∆=313 thousand of euros in assets), slightly older (∆=0.2 years), less liquid 
(∆=-0.06) and more levered (∆=1 p.p.) companies, even though we did not find statistical 
significance on the last variable. Profitability is, on average, the same throughout the month. At 
the last three days of the month, loans hold, on average, a higher amount (∆≈10,000€), lower 
maturity (∆=-13 days) and a lower interest rate (∆=-1 p.p.). The processing time decreases by 
4 days and the percentage of collateralized loans decreases from 40% to 36%. The default rate 
remains the same across the month, which provides evidence on a non-risk-taking behavior 
regarding term loans. 
Credit lines present a significantly higher variation between both periods. Compared with the 
rest of the month, credit lines granted by the end of the month are conceded to companies that 
are smaller (∆=-83 thousand of euros in assets), older (∆=1.1 years), less tangible (∆=-2 p.p.), 
less profitable (∆=-4 p.p.), more levered (∆=15 p.p.) and less liquid (∆=-0.08). Making a 
comparison between the contracts’ characteristics also presents interesting findings. End-of-
month credit lines have, on average, a lower amount (∆≈-20,000), a higher interest rate (∆=4.8 
p.p.) and processing time (∆=21 days). Major differences also arise when we acknowledge that 
only 25% are collateralized (compared with 74% on the rest of the month) and they are 4.5x 
more likely to default (9% against 2% from the rest of the month).  
We re-run regression (2), where  𝛾
𝑡
 is a vector of the previously used company and loan 
contract’s specificities, but this time we split our sample into term loans and credit lines. We 
present our results in Table 6. For term loans, there are no major variations between the 
beginning and the end of the month, compared with the remaining of the month: tangibility, 
profitability, leverage and liquidity remain constant, even though this last coefficient is hardly 
significant. The size and age factors present an improvement as the month goes by. Regarding 
the term loan contract, both the amount and the default rate increase at the beginning and at the 
end of the month, when compared with the average of the remainder of the month. The collateral 
decreases as the month goes by and so does the interest rate. Hence, regression (3) proves the 
conclusions we have initially forecasted with the descriptive analysis made earlier on this 
section: the major variations from both periods of the month arise from credit lines. Moving 
now to the regression analysis of credit lines (using the model outlined in regression (4)) the 
differences between both periods are magnified. As initially predicted, credit lines granted on 
the last three days present significant (statistically and economically) evidence on a decrease in 
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the borrowers’ quality: lower size, tangibility, profitability and liquidity, and higher leverage. 
As outlined earlier, the only improvement in a risk perspective is an increase on the average 
age of companies. 
𝛾𝑡| 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 =  𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡3𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡3𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡  + 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝑦𝑚𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡                                    (3) 
  𝛾𝑡| 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 =  𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡3𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡3𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡 +  𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝑦𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                  (4) 
 
We have also studied the evolution of the proportion of term loans and credit lines in the 
Portuguese credit market. The proportion of term loans (credit lines) is decreasing (increasing) 
throughout time, moving from 74.0% (26.0%) in 2013 to 52.8% (47.2%) in 2016. In Appendix 
1 we present the detailed yearly evolution of term loans and credit lines in the Portuguese 
market. 
After acknowledging the increasing weight of credit lines in the Portuguese credit market, we 
considered its justification. To do so, we analyzed the repetition pattern of credit lines granted 
to the same company by the same bank or, in other words, a common BINA-TINA credit 
relationship. We conclude that there is a 68%, 6%, 3% and 1% monthly, bi-monthly, trimester 
and semester repetition pattern, respectively. Focusing on the monthly results, our findings 
conclude that 68% of the entire universe of credit lines granted in Portugal are granted at least 
in two consecutive months, by the same bank to the same company. Our reasoning for it has as 
an underlying a product commonly issued by banks: overdrafts lines of credit, a tool used by 
companies to cover bank overdrafts. These instruments are typically issued at the end of the 
month, which goes in line with the reported end-of-month effect. 
 
4.3. Day 15th 
 
The end of the month is not the only period when there is a variation on the variables studied. 
During our study, we have assessed that the 15th of each month holds certain specificities that 
are worth reporting, both on the companies’ indicators and contracts ‘details. The results are 
presented in Table 7, and we believe that this variation is due to the fact that banks have to 
report, by this time of the month, the status of their loan portfolio to the CRC managed by the 
Bank of Portugal, including the credit overdue for more than 90 days. It is our intuition, before 
any empirical analysis, that this may create a bias towards an attempt to concede loans on the 
15th to entities that, ex ante, present better financial prospects – in other words, a window 
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dressing strategy. In a similar fashion, Allen and Saunders (1992) find a systematic upward 
window dressing adjustment made by US banks in order to improve the quality and amount of 
assets, prior to the reporting date to the Federal regulators.   
Table 7 presents our results concerning the differences between the 15th and the rest of the 
month. Starting with Panel A (aggregate level), five out of six company indicators forecast 
firms with better prospects: older, bigger, more profitable, less levered and more liquid. Only 
the tangibility proxy shows a decrease in the companies’ prospects. These indicators go in line 
with a lower default rate of 3% (against 6% on the rest of the month). 55% of loans granted at 
the 15th are collateralized, whereas only 37% hold this status on the remainder of the month. 
The average maturity almost triples, from 136 days to 402 days, which provides evidence that 
all these effects are driven by an increase on the proportion of term loans granted at this day. 
Given a reduction in the risk of these loans by the 15th, the fact that the average interest rate 
from 8.7% to 6% was expected, as well as the previously referred decrease in the delinquency 
rate (from 6% to 3%).   
Splitting the results between term loans and credit lines (Panels B and C), the improvements in 
company characteristics are common to both types of credit. Contracts’ features appear to be 
more pronounced in credit lines, where the major effects occur in the average number of credit 
lines that are collateralized (∆=45 p.p.), leading to large-scale reduction in the interest rate (∆=- 
5.3 p.p.). The default rate decreases, on average, from 6% to 3% – credit lines drive this effect, 
with a reduction from 8% to 2%. 
We perform a regression analysis on our three variables of interest: beginning of the month, 
end of the month and, now, we also consider the day 15th. Specifically, we run regression (5), 
including the same time-fixed effects considered before. Our results are presented in Table 8. 
                                      𝛾𝑡 =  𝐷𝑎𝑦15𝑡 + 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡3𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡3𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡 +  𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝑦𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                      (5) 
Our conclusions for the aggregate effect are that all the six characteristics studied for companies 
present significant improvements compared with the rest of the month. The level of collateral 
also shows a positive increase (0.1) and, as expected, the default rate is negatively (it decreases) 
affected by the day 15th (-0.01). Table 8 also allows to compare the end-of-month with the day 
15h, and the differences between both periods are clear: the first presents a clear relaxation in 




4.4. Time to approval 
 
The time to approval is defined as the difference between the consultation date (when the loan 
officer consulted the credit status of the prospective client on the CRC database) and the 
operation date (effective loan’s concession date). The average time to approval in our period is 
33 days. Figure 8 plots the monthly evolution of time to approval and we can see a major 
increase by the end of the month: it starts rising three days before the end of the month and 
achieves 42 days by the last day of the month. Dividing our sample in loans granted at the end 
of the month and the rest of the month, the average time to approval is 39 and 31 days, 
respectively. However, this increase by the end of the month is driven by credit lines (24 to 45 
days) – loan officers decrease the processing time of term loans as the month approaches its 









An increase in the processing time by the end of the month went against our initial intuition. 
Since we have already provided evidence on a risk-taking behavior for loans granted on the last 
days, we were expecting that loan officers would decrease their screening efforts, hence the 
processing time. However, we found an alternative justification that proves to be robust to the 
assumption that loans’ requests are approximately uniformly distributed throughout the month. 
One could argue that loan officers approve loans with positive prospects during the month 
(which can be justified by a default rate 4 percentage points lower, opposed to loans granted at 
the end of the month) and shift an eventual approval of loans with lower quality to the end of 
the month – these loans will only be approved if loan officers need to attain a certain monthly 
quota of capital allocation. By employing a “hold and grant if needed” strategy, the time to 
Figure 8: Daily evolution of loans' time to approval 
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approval of these loans rises, as they remain in the loan officers’ inventory during the remaining 
days until the end of the month. 
In order to further explore the impact of time to approval, we divide this variable into “fast time 
to approval” for loans whose time to approval is below the 25th percentile (11 days) and “slow 
time to approval” for the ones above the 75th percentile (61 days). After that, we run regression 
(6) to study the differences between companies and contracts according to how fast the 
processing time of their loan was. The results, presented in Table 9, are aligned with our forecast 
that supports the “hold and grant if needed” strategy: loans that take more time to be approved 
present worse prospects. A curious fact is that loans that are approved fast also contribute (yet 
in a smaller scale) negatively for the prospects of the loan. Taking “age” as an example, one 
can see that the coefficient for a fast time to approval is -0.78 and for the slow time to approval 
is -0.91. In other terms, even though that a slow time to approval is more harmful for the loan 
prospects, a fast time to approval also affects it negatively – the same occurs with tangibility, 
leverage, liquidity and collateral. However, the default rate is not impacted by a fast time to 
approval, but it is by a slow time to approval, as previously forecasted (0.01). Loans that take 
more time to be approved are very likely to be credit lines, given the coefficient obtained by 
studying the variable “maturity” (-159.34). 
 
                         𝛾𝑡 =  𝐹𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝑦𝑚𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡                            (6) 
 
4.5. Impact of the end-of-month effect 
 
In the previous sections, we have identified and studied the end-of-month impact for term loans 
and credit lines. In this section we perform a set of simple back-of-the-envelope calculations to 
measure the impact of this phenomenon in terms of credit overdue 
Our approach is as follows. Using the CRC database, we get data from the total amount of credit 
granted to Portuguese non-financial corporations from 2013 to 2016, divided between credit 
lines and term loans. Our previous computations also allow us to divide the amount granted in 
each month into end-of-month and the rest of the month, and the default rates for each period. 
Hence, we can gauge the effect of the end-of-month “boost” as 
𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑡 =  𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
− 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡




The credit overdue with no end of month effect assumes that the default rate throughout the 
month is always the same, and can be computed as follows. 




The credit overdue estimated with end of month effect splits the default rate into two 
possibilities, to take into account the previously reported increase by the end of the month. We 
also manage to isolate the percentage of term loans and credit lines, divided by end-of-month 
and the rest of the month. We compute it as follows. 
∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡






𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 = [(𝐸𝑂𝑀𝑡
𝐶𝐿) × (𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑂𝑀
𝐶𝐿 ) + (𝑅𝑂𝑀𝑡
𝐶𝐿) × (𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝐶𝐿 )] 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 = [(𝐸𝑂𝑀𝑡
𝑇𝐿) × (𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑂𝑀
𝑇𝐿 ) + (𝑅𝑂𝑀𝑡
𝑇𝐿) × (𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝑇𝐿 )] 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑂𝑀 = 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ;  𝑅𝑂𝑀 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ;  𝐶𝐿 = 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒;  𝑇𝐿 = 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 
 
We provide our detailed computations in Appendix 2. We assess a total amount of potential 
credit overdue, in Portugal, for the period comprised between 2013 and 2016 of €8.28 billion, 
of which 38.7% (€3.2 billion) are a consequence of the end-of-month effect, and the associated 




In this section, we provide two insights that act as robustness checks. First, we want to check 
whether the end-of-month effect is not just a consequence of variable-based compensation as a 
function of the amount granted by each loan officer. For this, we use the economic and financial 
crisis that led to the Economic Adjustment Program for Portugal in 2011 as our ground basis. 
During this period, many banks were making sizable losses and thus there were no profits to be 
distributed. Variable remuneration was thus either inexistent or substantially reduced for these 
banks during this period. To study this effect, and following the stream of research of several 
authors (for instance Agarwal and Ben-David, 2014 and Cao et al., 2018), we split our sample 
between loans granted by profitable and non-profitable banks. We then assess the end-of-month 
effect in the two samples. Figures 9 and 10 present the evolution of the end-of-month effect for 
the two groups, and we can see that, even though profitable banks have a higher end-of-month 
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effect, non-profitable banks present a significant trend of this effect (almost 25%). For this 
reason, we extend the previous authors’ analysis, in a sense that we verify an end-of-month 
effect that occurs in banks that hold a reward system based on loan amount, but also in the ones 
that do not. 
 
 
It is also important to mention that we are using perturbed data, a method used by the Bank of 
Portugal to preserve the anonymity of the databases. This technique holds the drawback of 
reducing the magnitude off all the statistical inference performed on it. For this reason, our 
results can potentially become more impactful if they are replicated in the original (non-




In this dissertation, we document a strong monthly cycle in the Portuguese credit market: credit 
quantity sharply increases towards the end of the month, while quality follows the opposite 
pattern. We isolate this effect and conclude that it is a consequence of credit lines granted at the 
end of the month, to companies that show ex ante worse prospects (compared with companies 
that get credit during the rest of the month). The default rate, measured as a 1-year failure in 
payment is 4.5x larger, when we establish a comparison with credit lines conceded during the 
remaining days of the month. The repetition pattern of the end-of-month effect points towards 
the use of overdraft lines of credit. Its impact, measured as the increase in credit overdue, is 
€3.2 billion throughout our period of analysis. 
Figure 9: Daily distribution of new operations (new contracts) 
for profitable banks 
Figure 10: Daily distribution of new operations (new 
contracts) for non-profitable banks 
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We finish our dissertation by presenting shortcomings of our analysis, and possible extensions 
for future research. Firstly, the field of end-of-month performance misalignments is still in a 
freshman stage and, for that reason, we cannot compare our results for Portugal with the ones 
for different countries. Cao et al. (2018) is, to the best of our knowledge, the closest study to 
ours, but only considers two banks in the Chinese market, which raises concerns regarding the 
representativeness of the sample used. Secondly, banking activity in Portugal is, to some extent, 
less sophisticated than in other markets. This fact prevents us to deepen our analysis to the field 
of syndicated lending and study whether the pattern remains. Thirdly, we lack data on CDS 
spreads for the majority Portuguese banks, which does not allow us to evaluate if the market is 
aware of such risk-taking towards the end of the month.  
Future streams of research in this field could include an incorporation of hard and soft 
information in the end-of-month effect. Specifically, we find it curious whether “lending 
relationships” play a role on the relaxation of loan officers’ standards by the end of the month. 
There is already research on the impact of lending relationships on the loan contract (Berger 
and Udell, 1995), but its monthly evolution is still an open topic. Besides it, forthcoming 
research could study whether specific banks tend to engage in this activity towards the end of 
the month - in fact, we may be in the presence of a risk-shifting mechanism. Lastly, our 
dissertation presents evidence on a decrease in borrowers’ quality by the end of the month. The 
question that remains is what would be the impact to those borrowers if banks did not engage 
in this activity. Companies that constantly use overdraft lines of credit may lead us to believe 
that they would default if they could not use this product. In other words, can we be in the 
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Variable Mean Standard Deviation Percentile 25 Percentile 50 Percentile 90 Number of observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Size 14.08 2.01 12.66 14.02 18.68 2,954,167
Age 21.29 14.43 10 19 40 2,887,234
Tangibility 0.24 0.22 0.06 0.18 9.57 2,954,374
Profitability -0.02 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.09 2,954,374
Leverage 0.79 0.56 0.57 0.72 1.02 2,954,374
Liquidity 1.90 2.09 1.03 1.37 3.26 2,952,627
Amount 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.14 2,956,307
Collateral 0.37 0.48 0 0 1 2,956,307
Maturity 143.51 372.40 0 43 182 2,956,307
Interest rate 8.66 7.23 3.96 6.04 21.97 2,956,307
Processing time 32.57 25.61 11 26 73 216,522
Default 0.06 - - - - -
Panel A - Aggregate level
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Percentile 25 Percentile 50 Percentile 90 Number of observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Size 14.26 1.95 12.89 14.23 16.77 633,843
Age 21.13 14.33 11 19 39 633,843
Tangibility 0.23 0.21 0.06 0.17 0.54 633,843
Profitability -0.03 0.19 -0.01 0.01 0.06 633,843
Leverage 0.79 0.21 0.06 0.17 0.54 633,843
Liquidity 1.76 1.85 2.00 1.32 2.87 633,188
Amount 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.12 633,843
Collateral 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 633,843
Maturity 135.85 330.12 0 59 180 633,843
Interest rate 10.00 7.09 5.27 7.16 22.67 633,843
Processing time 35.13 26.16 12 30 76 37,913
Default 0.08 - - - - -
Panel B - Year level (2013)
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics on Credit Evolution, from 2013 to 2016. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics on the evolution of credit, from 2013 to 2016. Panel A 
and Panel B presents the aggregate and the year-level summary statistics, respectively. We 
measure size, age, tangibility, profitability, leverage and liquidity as firm-specific characteristics 
(section 3 describes these variables). Concerning the loan contract, we assess the amount (in 
millions of Euros), collateral (reported as a dummy variable), maturity (in years), interest rate 
(in percentage points), processing time (in days) and default occurrence (as the percentage, from 
0 to 1, of loans granted in that year that defaulted one year after). Column (1) presents the 
variable studied, columns (2) to (6) report statistical measures, namely, mean, standard 
deviation, percentile 25, percentile 50, percentile 90, and column (7) displays the number of 








Variable Mean Standard Deviation Percentile 25 Percentile 50 Percentile 90 Number of observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Size 14.15 1.99 12.75 14.09 16.81 636,436
Age 21.00 14.51 10 19 40 636,436
Tangibility 0.24 0.22 0.06 0.18 0.56 636,436
Profitability -0.02 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.09 636,436
Leverage 0.79 0.53 0.58 0.73 1.02 636,436
Liquidity 1.86 2.01 1.03 1.36 3.11 635,825
Amount 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.13 636,436
Collateral 0.34 0.47 0.0 0.0 1.00 636,436
Maturity 149.7 371.4 0.0 58.0 183.0 636,436
Interest rate 9.28 7.12 4.69 6.54 22.66 636,436
Processing time 32.8 25.9 10 27 73 45,422
Default 0.06 - - - - -
Panel B - Year level (2014)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Percentile 25 Percentile 50 Percentile 90 Number of observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Size 14.02 2.04 12.58 13.94 16.79 867,782
Age 21.29 14.44 10 19 40 867,782
Tangibility 0.24 0.23 0.06 0.18 0.58 867,782
Profitability -0.02 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.10 867,782
Leverage 0.80 0.59 0.56 0.72 1.03 867,782
Liquidity 1.96 2.17 1.04 1.39 3.45 866,549
Amount 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.16 867,782
Collateral 0.43 0.50 0 0 1 867,782
Maturity 141.27 378.97 0 30 182 867,782
Interest rate 8.40 7.38 3.46 5.70 22.01 867782
Processing time 31.7 25.4 11 24 73 73,825
Default 0.05 - - - - -
Panel B - Year level (2015)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Percentile 25 Percentile 50 Percentile 90 Number of observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Size 13.96 2.04 12.53 13.87 16.70 818,246
Age 21.67 14.43 11 19 40 818,246
Tangibility 0.25 0.23 0.06 0.18 0.59 818,246
Profitability -0.01 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.10 818,246
Leverage 0.79 0.59 0.56 0.72 1.01 818,246
Liquidity 1.99 2.21 1.04 1.41 3.51 817,065
Amount 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.15 818,246
Collateral 0.43 0.49 0 0 1 818,246
Maturity 147 396.13 0 27 182 818,246
Interest rate 7.42 7.04 2.78 4.90 19.91 818,246
Processing time 31.8 25.2 10 25 72 59,362
Default 0.05 - - - - -
Panel B - Year level (2016)
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Regression output on Credit Evolution, using the end-of-month and the beginning-of-
month effect, from 2013 to 2016. 
Table 2 reports the regression output from regression 2, for the aggregate level. The variables 
presented in column (1) are the same as the ones described in Table 1. Column (2) and (3) 
present the coefficient obtained by regressing each variable of column (1) on the end-of-month 
and beginning-of-month effect. Column (4) presents the R-squared and column (5) the 
Prob>F. Robust standard errors are presented below each coefficient in parenthesis. ***, ** 
and * denotes statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable Last 3 days First 3 days R2 Prob > F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
New Operations 0.10*** 0.00*** 0.51 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
Size -1.10*** -0.05*** 0.08 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Age -3.10*** -0.13*** 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.04)
Tangibility 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Profitability -0.05*** 0.00*** 0.02 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Leverage 0.17*** 0.00** 0.02 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Liquidity 3.00** 0.08 0.00 0.14
(1.53) (0.95)
Amount 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Collateral -0.20*** 0.04*** 0.07 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Maturity -181.09*** 35.45*** 0.06 0.00
(0.41) (1.14)
Interest rate 5.93*** 0.10*** 0.19 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
Processing time 7.94*** 0.14 0.03 0.00
(0.14) (0.21)
















Loans and companies' comparison between the end of the month and the rest of the 
month, from 2013 to 2016. 
Table 3 reports the comparison regarding the average company and the average loan contract, 
from 2013 to 2016, divided into end of month (2) and the rest of the month (3). The variables 
presented in column (1) are the same as the ones described in Table 1. Column (4) outlines the 
p-value for the difference in means between column (2) and column (3). 
Variable End of month Rest of month p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 13.39 14.50 0.00
Age 19.40 22.43 0.00
Tangibility 0.24 0.24 0.19
Profitability -0.05 0.00 0.00
Leverage 0.90 0.73 0.00
Liquidity 1.87 1.96 0.00
Amount 0.72 0.52 0.00
Collateral 0.27 0.44 0.00
Maturity 32.59 210.63 0.00
Interest rate 12.12 6.57 0.00
Processing time 38.77 30.81 0.00
Default 0.08 0.04 0.00
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Term loans and credit lines comparison, from 2013 to 2016. 
Table 4 reports the comparison regarding the average term loan and credit line from 2013 to 
2016. The variables presented in column (1) are the same as the ones described in Table 1. The 
mean of each variable studied is presented in column (2) for term loans and in column (3) for 
credit lines. Column (4) outlines the p-value for the difference in means between column (2) 
and column (3). 
Variable Term Loans Credit Lines p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 14.64 13.17 0.00
Age 22.93 18.28 0.00
Tangibility 0.24 0.24 0.00
Profitability 0.00 -0.05 0.00
Leverage 0.72 0.90 0.00
Liquidity 1.85 2.00 0.00
Amount 0.05 0.08 0.00
Collateral 0.40 0.33 0.00
Maturity 232.12 - 0.00
Interest rate 6.38 12.36 0.00
Processing time 31.52 35.60 0.00
Default 0.04 0.08 0.00
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8.5. Company and loans’ differences between term loans and credit lines, the end 





Loans and companies' comparison between the end of the month and the rest of the 
month, from 2013 to 2016, divided into term loans (Panel A) and credit lines (Panel B). 
Table 5 reports the comparison regarding the average company and the average loan contract, 
from 2013 to 2016, divided into end of month (2) and the rest of the month (3), both for term 
loans (Panel A) and credit lines (Panel B). The variables presented in column (1) are the same 
as the ones described in Table 1. Column 4 outlines the p-value for the difference in means 
between column (2) and column (3). 
Variable End of month Rest of month p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 14.76 14.63 0.00
Age 23.13 22.91 0.00
Tangibility 0.24 0.24 0.00
Profitability 0.00 0.00 0.00
Leverage 0.73 0.72 0.20
Liquidity 1.79 1.85 0.00
Amount 0.06 0.05 0.00
Collateral 0.36 0.40 0.00
Maturity 220.63 233.26 0.00
Interest rate 6.29 6.39 0.00
Processing time 27.90 31.95 0.00
Default 0.04 0.04 0.13
Panel A - Term Loans
Variable End of month Rest of month p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 13.15 13.30 0.00
Age 18.74 17.65 0.00
Tangibility 0.24 0.26 0.00
Profitability -0.06 -0.02 0.00
Leverage 0.93 0.78 0.00
Liquidity 1.99 2.07 0.00
Amount 0.07 0.09 0.00
Collateral 0.25 0.74 0.00
Maturity - - -
Interest rate 13.13 8.30 0.00
Processing time 44.74 24.19 0.00
Default 0.09 0.02 0.00
Panel B - Credit Lines
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8.6. Regression output, using the last three days and the first three days, divided 
into term loans and credit lines 
  Table 6 
Regression output on Credit Evolution, using the end-of-month and the beginning-of-
month effect, divided into term loans (Panel A) and credit lines (Panel B), from 2013 to 
2016. 
Table 6 reports the regression outputs from regressions 3 and 4, for term loans (Panel A) and 
credit lines (Panel B). The variables presented in column (1) are the same as the ones described 
in Table 1 Column (2) and (3) present the coefficient obtained by regressing each variable of 
column (1) on the end-of-month and beginning-of-month effect. Column (4) presents the R-
squared and column (5) the Prob>F. Robust standard errors are presented below each coefficient 
in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  
Variable Last 3 days First 3 days R2 Prob > F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
New Operations 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.26 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Size 0.11*** -0.05*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.18*** -0.22*** 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
Tangibility 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Profitability 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Leverage 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Liquidity -0.22 -0.22 0.00 0.74
(0.29) (0.41)
Amount 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Collateral -0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Maturity -4.36*** 38.87*** 0.02 0.00
(1.16) (1.24)
Interest rate -0.05*** 0.15*** 0.11 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Processing time -3.45*** 0.20 0.02 0.00
(0.20) (0.23)
Default 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
































Variable Last 3 days First 3 days R2 Prob > F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
New Operations 0.28*** 0.00 0.53 0.00
(0.02) (0.00)
Size -0.20*** 0.03** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
Age 1.06*** 0.56*** 0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.11)
Tangibility -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Profitability -0.04*** 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Leverage 0.17*** -0.02*** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Liquidity -0.47 2.55 0.00 0.93
(3.09) (8.68)
Amount -0.02*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Collateral -0.49*** 0.00 0.27 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Maturity - - - -
- -
Interest rate 5.63*** -0.05 0.10 0.00
(0.02) (0.05)
Processing time 19.51*** -0.62 0.16 0.00
(0.22) (0.45)
Default 0.06*** 0.00 0.02 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Panel B - Credit Lines
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8.7. Company and loans’ differences between term loans and credit lines, the day 























Loans and companies' comparison between the day 15th and the rest of the month, 
from 2013 to 2016, divided into an aggregate level (Panel A), term loans (Panel B) and 
credit lines (Panel C). 
Table 7 reports the comparison regarding the average company and the average loan contract, 
from 2013 to 2016, divided into the day 15th (2) and the rest of the month (3), both for the 
aggregate level (Panel A), term loans (Panel B) and credit lines (Panel B). The variables 
presented in column (1) are the same as the ones described in Table 1. Column 4 outlines the 
p-value for the difference in means between column (2) and column (3). 
Variable Day 15 Rest of month p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 14.86 14.05 0.00
Age 23.98 21.21 0.00
Tangibility 0.29 0.24 0.00
Profitability 0.01 -0.02 0.00
Leverage 0.72 0.80 0.00
Liquidity 1.82 1.91 0.00
Amount 0.06 0.06 0.00
Collateral 0.55 0.37 0.00
Maturity 402.18 135.58 0.00
Interest rate 6.02 8.74 0.00
Processing time 28.60 32.80 0.00
Default 0.03 0.06 0.00
Panel A - Aggregate level
Variable Day 15 Rest of month p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 14.96 14.63 0.00
Age 24.18 22.87 0.00
Tangibility 0.29 0.24 0.00
Profitability 0.01 0.00 0.00
Leverage 0.72 0.72 0.40
Liquidity 1.80 1.85 0.00
Amount 0.05 0.05 0.00
Collateral 0.52 0.40 0.00
Maturity 443.28 222.48 0.00
Interest rate 5.91 6.40 0.00
Processing time 29.03 31.70 0.00
Default 0.03 0.04 0.00
Panel B - Term Loans
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Variable Day 15 Rest of month p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 13.83 13.17 0.00
Age 21.92 18.56 0.00
Tangibility 0.28 0.24 0.00
Profitability -0.01 -0.05 0.00
Leverage 0.71 0.91 0.00
Liquidity 2.00 2.00 0.87
Amount 0.10 0.08 0.00
Collateral 0.82 0.37 0.00
Maturity - - -
Interest rate 7.10 12.40 0.00
Processing time 24.65 35.84 0.00
Default 0.02 0.08 0.00
Panel C - Credit Lines
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8.8. Regression output, using day 15th, the last three days and the first three days 
 
  Table 8 
Regression output on Credit Evolution, using the day 15th, the end-of-month and the 
beginning-of-month effect, from 2013 to 2016. 
Table 8 reports the regression output from regression 5, for the aggregate level. The variables 
presented in column (1) are the same as the ones described in Table 1 Column (2), (3) and (4) 
present the coefficient obtained by regressing each variable of column (1) on the day 15th, end-
of-month and beginning-of-month effect. Column (5) presents the R-squared and column (6) 
the Prob>F. Robust standard errors are presented below each coefficient in parenthesis. ***, 
** and * denotes statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable Day 15th Last 3 days First 3 days R2 Prob > F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size 0.39*** -1.08*** -0.02*** 0.08 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 1.57*** -3.00*** -0.05 0.01 0.00
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
Tangibility 0.05*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Profitability 0.01*** -0.05*** 0.00*** 0.02 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Leverage -0.01*** 0.17*** 0.00 0.02 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Liquidity 1.18*** -5.63*** -0.79*** 0 0.00
(0.24) (0.09) (0.16)
Amount 0.00*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Collateral 0.10*** -0.19*** 0.05*** 0.07 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Maturity 201.67*** -169.65*** 46.90*** 0.07 0.00
(2.05) (0.41) (1.14)
Interest rate 0.51*** 5.91*** 0.07*** 0.19 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Processing time -1.63*** 7.80*** 0.00 0.03 0.00
(0.21) (0.14) (0.21)































Regression output on Credit Evolution, using slow and fast time to approval, from 2013 
to 2016. 
Table 9 reports the regression output from regression 6, for the aggregate level. The variables 
presented in column (1) are the same as the ones described in Table 1 Column (2), (3) and (4) 
present the coefficient obtained by regressing each variable of column (1) on the day 15th, end-
of-month and beginning-of-month effect. Column (5) presents the R-squared and column (6) 
the Prob>F. Robust standard errors are presented below each coefficient in parenthesis. ***, 
** and * denotes statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable
Fast time to 
approval
Slow time to 
approval
R
2 Prob > F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size -0.34*** -0.07*** 0.04 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Age -0.78*** -0.91*** 0.03 0.00
(0.08) (0.08)
Tangibility -0.01*** -0.02*** 0.02 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Profitability -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Leverage 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Liquidity -0.54 -1.60*** 0.01 0.00
(0.48) (0.46)
Amount -0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Collateral -0.01*** -0.13*** 0.05 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Maturity -19.38*** -159.34*** 0.04 0.00
(3.25) -2.90
Interest rate 1.02*** 0.26*** 0.06 0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
Processing time -23.14*** 42.02*** 0.85 0.00
(0.04) (0.06)






9.1. Evolution of term loans and credit lines, from 2013 and 2016 
 
In this Appendix, we present the yearly evolution of term loans and credit lines in the 
Portuguese credit market, from 2013 to 2016 (we used data from the Ministry of Economy 
regarding the total credit amount). The results are as follows. 
 
As we have previously reported, the weight of term loans (credit lines) is decreasing 
(increasing) as time goes by. Term loans represented 74% of the total market at 2013 and 
decreased 21.2 percentage points to 2016, whereas credit lines followed the opposite evolution. 
The total amount of credit granted to Portuguese non-financial companies is, according to the 
table, decreasing as time goes by. This fact is against our findings that report an increase in the 
loan amount. This is due to the fact that the data from the Ministry of Economy only includes 
capital that has effectively been used (ignoring unused portions of committed credit lines, which 













Year Term loans (million €) Term loans (%) Credit lines (million €) Credit lines (%) Total (million €)
2013 36,340 74.0% 12,768 26.0% 49,108
2014 28,904 70.1% 12,328 29.9% 41,232
2015 18,766 55.5% 15,046 44.5% 33,812
2016 15,753 52.8% 14,083 47.2% 29,836
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9.2. Back-of-the-envelope computation on the end-of-month impact in credit 
overdue 
 
In this Appendix, we develop our method to compute the effect in credit overdue arising from 
the previously studied end-of-month effect. We also present all the intermediate computations 
that allowed us to attain the amount displayed in section 4.5. All the computations are presented 
in billions of euros, unless specified otherwise. 
Using the CRC database, we are able to extract data regarding the amount of term loans and 
credit lines granted, for each year of our analysis. The results for this yearly division are 
presented in the following table. 
 
We then proceed to the calculation of the end-of-month effect for each type of credit (term loan 
and credit line), for each year under analysis. The results are as follows. 
 
Using the default rates computed in Section 4, we are able to determine the amount that 
defaulted in each period of the month, applying formula (1). The results are presented in the 
following table. 
                        ∑ [(𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑡  ×  𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡) + (𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡  ×  𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡)]
2016
𝑡=2013
                         (1) 
 
Year Term loans (million €) Term loans (%) Credit lines (million €) Credit lines (%) Total (million €)
2013 36,340 74.0% 12,768 26.0% 49,108
2014 28,904 70.1% 12,328 29.9% 41,232
2015 18,766 55.5% 15,046 44.5% 33,812
2016 15,753 52.8% 14,083 47.2% 29,836
Year Term loans (EOM) Term loans (ROM) Credit lines (EOM) Credit lines (ROM) Total (million €)
2013 2,907 33,433 10,981 1,788 49,108
2014 2,601 26,302 10,479 1,848 41,232
2015 1,877 16,887 12,488 2,558 33,812
2016 1,418 14,336 11,829 2,253 29,836
Year  DR Term loans (EOM) DR Term loans (ROM) DR Credit lines (EOM) DR Credit lines (ROM) Total DR (million €)
2013 116 1,137 988 36 2,277
2014 104 1,052 943 37 2,136
2015 75 676 1,124 51 1,926
2016 57 573 1,065 45 1,740
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We have to consider two scenarios. The first one assumes that the end-of-month effect does not 
exist: the default rate is the same throughout the month. The second one assumes the existence 
of the end-of-month effect, hence we have two different default rates (one for the end of the 
month and a different one for the rest of the month). Specifically, we use formula (2) to compute 
the end-of-month impact. 
      𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑡 =  𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
− 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
     (2) 
The second segment of formula (2) matches the first scenario we previously described. Under 
this scenario, it is feasible to assume that the default rate is the same across the month. For this 
reason, we compute it as: 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡




To compute the first segment, one must take into account the end-of-month effect, and the 
associated difference between default rates in the two periods of the month. We compute it as 
follows. 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
=  𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 + 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠, where: 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 = [(𝐸𝑂𝑀𝑡
𝐶𝐿) × (𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑂𝑀
𝐶𝐿 ) + (𝑅𝑂𝑀𝑡
𝐶𝐿) × (𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝐶𝐿 )]  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (4) 
       𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 = [(𝐸𝑂𝑀𝑡
𝑇𝐿) × (𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑂𝑀
𝑇𝐿 ) + (𝑅𝑂𝑀𝑡
𝑇𝐿) × (𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝑇𝐿 )]          (5) 
 
The following tables present the results of our computations for credit overdue, assuming non 
end-of-month effect on the first table, and its existence on the second one. 
 
The difference between the two outputs (8,280 and 5,076) is a direct match with formula (2). 
Hence, the impact from the end-of-month relaxation in loan officers’ standards is approximately 
3.2 billion euros on credit overdue, a 63% increase from the base scenario. 
Year  Overdue Term loans Overdue Credit lines Total Overdue
2013 1,454 255 1,709
2014 1,156 247 1,403
2015 751 301 1,052
2016 630 282 912
5,076
Year  Overdue Term loans Overdue Credit lines Total Overdue
2013 1,454 1,024 2,478
2014 1,156 980 2,136
2015 751 1,175 1,926
2016 630 1,110 1,740
8,280
